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In this paper, we analyse the disclosure of information in a sample Japanese initial public 
offering (IPO) prospectuses primarily with respect to voluntary disclosure of non-accounting 
information on knowledge-based resources – also called intellectual capital. Differences in 
reporting practice, especially with respect to IPO‟s, however, reflect to a major degree 
differences in institutional settings, culture and traditions. In addition, this paper analyzes 
underpricing, long-term performance and the cost of capital. The methodology used in the 
analysis is a disclosure index consisting of 78 items. Disclosure index research in accounting 
and business reporting practices has been widely applied, because such studies represent an 
aspect of disclosure quality. Based on statistical analysis, it will be examined to what extent of 
managerial ownership prior to the IPO, industry type, company size and age affect the amount 
of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure. The results are interpreted in the light of the 
increasing importance of disclosing information on value drivers, strategy and intellectual 
capital to the capital market and constitute a contribution to the ongoing debate on corporate 
reporting practices. Finally the paper discusses the future prospects on IC reporting from an 
international point of view, based on the empirical findings. 
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Since more than a decade much research and many studies have been pointed out that the 
traditional business reporting model is in the need to go beyond traditional financial reporting 
that put emphasis on historical, quantified, financial information (e.g. Eliott, 1992; AICPA, 
1994; Wallman 1995, 1996, 1997; ICAS, 1999; Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Eustace, 2001; FASB 
2001; Lev, 2001; ICAEW, 2003; Gu & Lev, 2004). Over the past decades, companies‟ 
disclosure of information has gained increased attention due to globalisation and integration 
of capital markets, greater mobility of monetary and actual goods, tougher competition, new 
dominating industries, and developments in IT and the Internet. Consequently, the demand for 
external communication applies to both traditional accounting and newer types of reporting 
such as intellectual capital statements, supplementary business reporting and prospectuses. 
 
A comprehensive set of intellectual capital (IC) studies observe that there is no consensus on a 
precise definition `intellectual capital´, as the terms `intangibles´ and `IC´ are frequently used 
interchangeably or synonymously (Rylander, Jacobsen & Ross, 2000; Lev, 2001, Meritum, 
2002; Lev & Zambon 2003; Marr, Schiuma & Neely, 2004). Despite the lack of an agreed 
definition of IC, a broad consensus that IC comprises three major elements: human capital, 
structural capital and relational capital, exists. Rylander and Peppard (2003) state that these 
elements allow a holistic view of all company‟s value-creating resources. Nonetheless, 
effective IC communication needs information on the drivers of long-term performance and 
information on the strategy of the firm (Rylander et al., 2003). 
 
During the past years, manifold Scandinavian examples on leading IC practice evolved from 
the first corporate IC statement of the Swedish insurance company Skandia in 1995 to the 
2003 IC reporting framework proposed and tested by the Danish Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation (Rimmel, 2004). Although a large stream of research on IC has 
been generated, up to now there are only few Japanese examples available (see Koga et al. 
2006.). 
 
Consequently, the aim of the present paper is to give an indication of the importance of 
intellectual capital information in Japanese initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses from all 




The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First recent developments in business 
reporting are discussed and it is argued that the IPO prospectuses should be studied in order to 
gain insight into the need for disclosure. Further, the section presents the factors that will be 
taken into consideration in explaining differences in disclosure. In the following two sections 
the methodology and the available data is described. The results are interpreted in the light of 
the increasing importance of disclosing information on value drivers, strategy and intellectual 
capital to the capital market and constitute a contribution to the ongoing debate on corporate 
reporting practices. Finally the paper will based on the empirical findings analyse future 
prospects on IC reporting from an international point of view. 
 
Corporate reporting, communication and the IPO prospectus 
information set that the traditional financial statements constitute. Lev and Zarowin (1998) as 
well as Francis and Schipper (1999) directly relate such a loss of informativeness of 
traditional financial statements‟ to the growth of intangible assets in playing a major role in 
the generation of corporate value. A common example of the contribution made by IC to 
corporate value is given by comparing market and book values. Lev‟s (2001) study of the 
average market-to-book ratio of the S&P 500 index from 1977 to 2000 has been frequently 
quoted as it reported a strong upward trend culminating in a value in excess of 6.0 by 2000. In 
other words, for every $6 of market value, only $1 appears on the balance sheet. The 1997-
2000 “dot.com” boom was followed by the well-known bubble burst with dramatically 
plunging of share prices after year 2000. 
 
This brings to mind that one has to be careful with not exaggerating values when dealing with 
intangible assets. Yet, a more recent study revealed that the S&P 500‟s average market-to-
book ratio declined to 4.5 by September 2003 (Gu & Lev, 2004), which still is a rather large 
difference. There is a corresponding body of research that indicates that capital market actors 
are continuously intrigued by information about intangibles (Holland & Johansson, 2003). 
Grasenick & Low (2004) stated that the disclosure of intangibles measurement receives also 
its power from the fact that they are drivers of values that can be measured and evaluated by 
management. 
The external communication of companies‟ intellectual capital has been altered into basically 
two approaches: either to integrate IC in an extended traditional balance sheet or to create a 
complementary IC statement (Rylander et al., 2000). The recognition of IC in the balance 
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sheet is often deemed to be unsuccessful due to the strict definition and recognition criteria, 
like in IAS 38. 
 
Scandinavia has a long tradition of attempts of composing IC statements (Guthrie & Petty, 
2000; Johansson, 2002). In the late 1980s, a group of Swedish practitioners “The Konrad 
Group” was elaborating about the invisible parts of the company that did not show up on the 
balance sheet. The Konrad Assets Theory divided the intangible parts of a company into three 
different categories, individual competence, internal structure and external structure utilising a 
set of 38 key indicators, ranging from financial performance indicators to new human 
resource measures (Konrad, 1988). The first corporate IC statement was issued by the 
Swedish insurance company Skandia in 1995 (Skandia, 1996), which became a prominent 
example among practitioners and researchers. However, after Skandia integrated their IC 
information into the traditional annual report the amount and content about IC shrank and 
blurred (Rimmel, 2003). 
 
A different approach to IC reporting was taken in Denmark. Instead of corporations‟ 
attempting to create IC statements individually, leading to largely incomparable reports, the 
Danish Agency for Trade and Industry organised a IC reporting project in collaboration with 
researchers and Danish companies. The first Danish guideline was published in 2001 (DATI, 
2001). In a sequel project 80 Danish companies participated in producing IC statements, 
which resulted in a revised guideline based on the experiences of the participating companies 
(Mouritsen et al., 2003). 
 
Various studies of investors‟ and analysts‟ demand for information indicate a substantial 
difference between the amount of information of this type found in companies‟ annual reports 
and the type of information demanded by the market (e.g. Eccles et al., 2001, Eccles & 
Mavrinac, 1995). In cooperation with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
(ICAS), Beattie (1999) studied the ability of financial reporting to satisfy users‟ demands. The 
results illustrated that although non-financial information still has lower priority than 
traditional financial information; users consider disclosure regarding risk factor and quality of 
management to be insufficient. 
Theoretically, additional relevant, non-financial information is expected to lower the cost of 
equity capital (cf. Verrecchia, 1983, 2001) because increased disclosure lowers investors‟ 
uncertainty about future prospects of the company and facilitates a more precise valuation of 
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the company (Botosan, 1997). Related to this argument, the disclosure of information on 
intellectual capital is expected to reduce information asymmetry and to enhance stock market 
liquidity and increase demand for companies´ securities (e.g. Diamond & Verecchia, 1991). 
Both Botosan (1997) and Richard and Welker (2001) confirm this in that they conclude that 
the quantity and quality of financial disclosure is negatively related to cost of equity capital 
for companies. 
 
The IPO prospectus has by Beattie (1999) as well as Cumby and Conrad (2001) been 
suggested as a „role model‟ for future reporting because companies are typically more open 
and future-oriented in their IPO reporting. It has also been claimed by Daily et al. (2003) that 
IPO prospectuses are likely to be especially accurate because companies are liable for any 
misleading or inaccurate information. Although the same could be said about other reporting 
media including the annual report it can be observed that the prospectus usually contains more 
information about future expectations regarding market developments and earnings, strategic 
direction and intent, management and board composition, etc., compared to the annual report 
from the same firm. This is at least the case for a number of Scandinavian prospectuses that 
have been examined by Bukh et al. (2005). However, there are likely to be substantial 
differences in national legislation and traditions with respect to disclosure in IPO 
prospectuses. In a recent study of disclosure in interim report of Greek firms by admission of 
securities to Athens Stock Exchanges, Mavridis (2002) noted for instance that annual reports, 
as they are used in other countries, are not very common among Greek medium-sized firms.  
 
At the time of admission for listing on the stock exchange, the company publishes its IPO 
prospectus in order to market the share to investors. An admission to listing on the stock 
exchange offers a unique opportunity to study the amount and type of voluntary information 
considered for disclosure to the capital market. Thus, Mather et al. (2000) argue that 
management has an incentive to present the company in the best possible light in order to 
maximise the proceeds of the share issue (see also Aharony et al., 1993). Although this could 
lead to earnings management, managers of companies involved in taking a company public 
have incentives to present the underlying information in the most favorable light possible 
(Mather et al., 2000). Thus, the IPO prospectus provides insight into which types of 
information are selected by a company and its advisors for presenting the company in relation 




Admission for listing on the stock exchange requires the company to report about its 
achievements, skills and growth potential in a reliable and sober manner, in order to 
demonstrate to investors that investing in the company will most likely generate a competitive 
return. This effort to attract investors is centred on the IPO prospectus, which clarifies the 
company‟s financial capability, performance, operation, skills, and the resources through 
which it intends to prove continued growth and increased shareholder wealth. With regard to 
this aspect, Ang and Brau (2002) show that the greater company transparency before the 
initial issue decreases the flotation costs of the IPO. Additionally, Schrand and Verrecchia 
(2004) find that greater disclosure frequency in the period prior to the IPO is associated with 
less underpricing. 
 
The annual report has not only investors as its readers as it also conveys information to 
employees, potential employees, customers, the press and other stakeholders. Compared to 
that the IPO prospectus have a more limited group of readers than annual reports, and some 
differences in extent of disclosure can be expected. Compared to annual reports, prospectuses 
can be expected to provide additional disclosure of the company‟s long-term strategy, a 
specification of leading non-financial indicators relevant in assessing the effectiveness of the 
strategy implementation, comprehensive disclosure on company risks, and a discussion of the 
relation between leading indicators and future profits (Cumby & Conrad 2001). 
 
Propositions concerning disclosure practices 
A substantial body of research conducted from an information-economics perspective has 
concentrated on studying why companies disclose more information than is required by 
regulation. In relation to IPO prospectuses, Jenkinson and Ljungquist (2001) provide a 
comprehensive review of the literature. In general, proxies for ex ante uncertainty such as, 
underwriter reputation (Megginson & Weiss, 1991) as well as disclosure of earnings forecasts 
in IPO prospectuses (Clarkson & Merkley, 1994) have been shown to reduce underpricing. 
Most underpricing models (cf. Jenkinson & Ljungquist, 2001) predict that reducing ex ante 
uncertainty, for example by improved disclosure, and reduces underpricing. Thus, by 
increasing voluntary disclosure, the ex ante uncertainty surrounding an issue is reduced and 
thus the firm‟s need for underpricing also lessens. 
 
In this paper, we study the extent of voluntary disclosure in Japanese IPO prospectuses and 
investigate whether this can be explained by four control variables – industry differences, 
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managerial ownership before the IPO, company size and company age. The first factor, 
industry differences, has previously been used to explain differences in disclosure in annual 
reports by Adrem (1999) and Cooke (1989) because there are differences in industry 
disclosure norms (cf. Gibbins et al., 1990). As intellectual capital is regarded as being 
especially important in high-tech industries, it is anticipated that IT and biotechnology 
companies will disclose more information than traditional manufacturing and commercial 
companies. Further, since the market-to-book values of IT and biotechnology companies are 
generally higher, the disclosure of measures that lie outside the traditional accounting realm is 
likely to be relatively more important. Despite these results, not all studies conclude that 
industry type makes a difference. Robb, Single and Zarzeski (2001), for instance, only find 
minimal industry effects, a result confirmed by and Ström (2004) in a sample of Swedish IPO 
prospectuses. 
 
Turning to a corporate governance perspective, the second factor, managerial ownership 
before the IPO, may influence companies‟ disclosure practices and thus the extent of 
disclosure in the IPO prospectus. Mather et al. (2000) argue that at the time of admission to 
the stock exchange, company management has an incentive to present the company in the best 
possible light in order to maximize the proceeds of the share issue (see also Aharony et al. 
1993). The existence of some degree of managerial ownership in the company thus becomes a 
mechanism for ensuring management–shareholder alignment of interests (Demirag et al., 
2000, p. 348; Sudarsanam 2000). Ruland et al. (1990) noted that the tendency to disclose 
managers‟ forecasts is greater for companies whose officers and directors hold a high 
percentage of shares. 
 
According to O‟Sullivan (2000, p. 409), we can expect less disclosure from management if 
there is significant managerial ownership. In accordance with this line of argument, directors 
of the board who themselves do not own a substantial portion of the company can be expected 
to encourage more intensive auditing and disclosure because they are more likely to perceive 
themselves as fulfilling a monitoring role. Similarly, Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994), in a 
study of listed Malaysian companies, conclude that the amount of voluntary disclosure varies 
with ownership structure.  
 
The third variable tested in the study, company size, has often been related to the amount of 
voluntary disclosure. Empirical studies date back to the 1950s, where, for example, Anton 
(1954) concluded that one-third of large American and Canadian companies regularly present 
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results to stockholders while the corresponding figures for small companies are one out of 
twenty. Robb, Single and Zarzeski (2001), for instance, find that larger firms provide higher 
levels of both forward-looking and historical non-financial disclosures in their annual reports 
than other firms. Among the explanations are that larger companies are more likely to have a 
wider ownership base, and that the costs of providing information are more prohibitive for 
small companies. The latter problem tends to grow with increased disclosure.  
 
However, another factor to be considered is that larger companies, when compared to smaller 
ones, seem less risky to investors and have better access to resources. Small companies thus 
have greater incentives to reduce uncertainty by disclosure. This argument presumes that a 
small company - all other things being equal – should disclose more information and more 
details on competitors than is the case for a large company. These implications have been 
supported in studies by, for example, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) and Adrem (1999). Despite 
this, not all studies conclude that the size of the company is a significant factor in explaining 
voluntary publication of information. For instance, Wallace (1988) and Stanga (1976) who 
conclude that size is not a significant factor in explaining differences in companies‟ reporting 
between Nigeria and the USA. 
 
Company age has often been seen as a proxy for risk in the sense that the more established 
companies are less risky. From this perspective, the extent of a company‟s disclosure is 
expected to be related to how many years it has been in business. For example, Kim & Ritter 
(1999, p. 430) provide evidence that non-financial information is of greater importance in the 
valuation of younger companies because forecast earnings work better for assessing younger 
companies than historical earnings do (cf. Klein, 1996; Amir & Lev, 1996). Furthermore, 
Jaggi (1997, p. 314) demonstrates that the number of years the company has been in business 
influences the accuracy of the forecasts disclosed in IPO prospectuses. These results indicate 
that there might be a negative relationship between the age of the company and the extent of 
its disclosure. 
 
From the prior empirical research outlined above, the four hypotheses below are developed. 
As none of the literature reviewed above relates directly to disclosures in connection with 





H1: Industry differences. There is no association with respect to disclosure of 
information on intellectual capital between companies in high-tech industries 
(IT and biotechnology) and traditional manufacturing and commercial 
companies 
H2: Managerial ownership. There is no association between the amount of 
disclosure on intellectual capital and the existence of managerial ownership 
before the IPO  
H3: Company size. There is no association between the amount of disclosure 
on intellectual capital and the size of the company.  
H4: Company age. There is no association between the amount of disclosure 
on intellectual capital and the age of the firm 
 
These factors have been raised and studied in the disclosure literature and can contribute with 
insights with respect to understanding the mechanisms of disclosure in connection with an 
IPO. While H1 might be explained by industry norms and institutionalized disclosure 
practices and furthermore that there are significant differences in competitive aspects across 
industry groups, the three latter control variables (H2, H3, H4) primarily concern the 
minimization of risk from the investors perspective. Pre-IPO managerial ownership is an 
important factor, because it indicates to potential investors whether the people who know the 
most about the future prospects of the company, namely its present management team, 
considers the company a good investment. Age and size are proxies for the chance of the 
company going bankrupt, i.e. age concerns the history of the company and size relates to 
whether it has critical mass to survive a fierce competitive environment over time. 
 
Methodology 
In the empirical part of this paper, a disclosure index is used to quantify the amount of 
information regarding intellectual capital included in the IPO prospectuses. There is an 
extensive amount of accounting literature relating to the use of disclosure scoreboards to 




Although current research showed considerable variations in the extent and measurement of 
disclosed items, they commonly share the interest in examining the relevance and usefulness 
of issued information for investors (Giner Inchausti, 1997). Many researchers have made 
attempts to provide a framework for disclosure literature (Street & Bryant, 2000; Wiedman, 
2000; Adrem, 1999; Cooke, 1989). These most frequently used frameworks approach existing 
disclosure literature by dividing disclosure information into the categories mandatory 
disclosure studies (Wallace et al., 1994), voluntary disclosure studies (Adrem, 1999; Hossain 
et al., 1994; Gray et al., 1995; Guthrie & Petty 2000) and disclosure studies that consider both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure items (Inchausti, 1997; Beattie  et al., 2002a). 
 
One area that disclosure scoreboard studies normally not discuss is the fact that the nature of 
volume measurements is limited to the amount of information. Consequently, the use of a 
disclosure scoreboard does not allow making a statement about why corporations disclose 
information or how users think of disclosed information (Rimmel, 2004). 
 
One study singled out by many researchers as the beginning of disclosure scoreboards for 
measuring disclosure was a study carried out by Cerf (1961), focusing the disclosure index of 
31 items on the information needs of financial analysts. Rimmel‟s (2003) chronological 
review showed considerable large variation in the number of items included from Barret‟s 
(1976) 17 item disclosure index to Cooke‟s (1989) 224 items disclosure scoreboard. Further, 
many prior disclosure studies are built on earlier disclosure scoreboards. For example 
Adrem‟s (1999) disclosure scoreboard is based on Meek, Roberts and Gray‟s (1995) 
disclosure scoreboard applying the same structure and items. 
 
Following the common path of disclosure index tradition, this study is a replication of the 
disclosure scoreboard applied in the recent disclosure study of information on intellectual 
capital in Danish IPO Prospectuses by Bukh et al. (2006).  
 
The particular research design was chosen for our study because the disclosure index 
approach represents a proxy for the quality of disclosure of intellectual capital in IPO 
prospectuses. When applying such an approach, it is, however, important to consider the 
reliability of the results and the objectivity of the study (Unerman, 2000). In the present study, 
these criteria are handled through a thorough literature review, clear instructions in the coding 
process and verifying the coding through separate coding by multiple researchers. It can be 
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argued that the amount of disclosure might not be an exact indicator of disclosure quality 
(Beattie et al. 2004a, p. 210). However, as we are concerned with extent of disclosure, we 
find the disclosure index method to fulfil our requirements satisfactorily. 
 
The disclosure index 
There are no widely accepted theoretical guidelines for selecting items; therefore, the 
successful use of the disclosure index methodology depends on critical and cautious selection 
of items (Marston & Shrives 1991). As the focus of this article is voluntary information, the 
choice of items was based on a thorough inspection of the literature on corporate disclosure 
(cf. Eccles & Mavrinac, 1995; AICPA, 1994; Beattie et al., 2002b; Beattie & Pratt, 2002a) 
and intellectual capital reporting (Guthrie & Petty 2000; DATI, 2001; Sveiby 2000). 
Regarding intellectual capital statements, the experiences and results of the major Danish 
project concerning intellectual capital statements (DATI 2001; DMSTI 2003) were a major 
source of insight. 
 
In our study of the extent of voluntary disclosure of non-accounting information – e.g. 
information on knowledge-based resources, strategy and processes – in Japanese IPO 
prospectuses, a disclosure index consisting of 78 items was applied. Table 1 depicts the 
division of these items into 6 different categories and the number of items in them. All the 








Employees (27 items) 
Customers (14 items) 
IT (5 items) 
Processes (8 items) 
Research & Development (9 items) 
Strategic Statements (15 items) 
 
Table 1: The disclosure index 
 
The contents of each IPO prospectus were compared to the items on the disclosure scoreboard 
and coded as 1 or 0, depending upon whether the IPO prospectus contained or did not contain 
the voluntary disclosure. Accordingly, the extent of disclosure was quantified as the 
percentage of recorded information items found in the prospectus. In other words, the IPO 
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prospectus is given one point if a given index item is found in the prospectus and no points if 
the given item is not found in the prospectus. This can be seen in the following formula, 








 / M) ×100%, 
 
where di expresses itemi with the value found in the IPO prospectus in question otherwise 0. 
M expresses the maximum of information disclosed in the IPO, which could be 78 items. 
 
The analysis of the disclosure scoreboard for this study is additive and unweighted following 
the path of the studies conducted by Adrem (1999); Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) and 
Cooke (1989). All three studies referred to Spero‟s (1979) empirical findings that weighting 
of information is not relevant for several reasons. The most important one is to decrease 
subjectivity, which would be the case if applying special weights for different items, as the 
user‟s preferences are unknown. Hence, either a company discloses a voluntary item in its 
IPO prospectus or not, which shows that the number of items measures the amount of 
disclosure. No ranking list for the importance of different items is applied nor is the number 
of words about an item used. This procedure is corroborated by the criticisms discussed in the 
study by Hackston and Milne (1996). 
 
Data 
The data consists of a sample of IPO prospectuses from stock exchange listings at the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. The 120 Japanese IPO prospectuses were obtained from EOL online 
systems. Our data does not include prospectuses disclosed in connection with capital 
increases.  
 
The average disclosure of all the indicators included in our disclosure index is 13.3%, varying 
from NEC electronics (Japanese electronics company , IPO in 2003) prospectus, which 
discloses 34.6% of the proposed voluntary information items, to Toshin Denki (Japanese 
wholesale firm, IPO in 2003), which discloses 2.6% of the proposed voluntary information 
items. 
 
Of the overall categories of the disclosure index, „strategic statements‟ is the information 
category where most information is disclosed, averaging 18% across the Japanese sample (see 
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Appendix 1 for all sub-totals and disclosure percentages). Table 2 below classifies the IPO 
prospectuses by industry. 
 
 Pharmaceutical and IT and  Trade and  Production Total # 
IPOs 
 Research Technology Service  
Japan 1 28 64 27 120 
Table 2: Number of prospectuses classified by type of business 
 
Descriptive statistics for the three continuous variables „age‟, „size‟, and „managerial 
ownership before the IPO‟ are shown in Table 3. All the data for the analyses were contained 





 Mean Std. 
deviation 
Min. Max. Variance 
Disclosure (number 
of items) 
Japan 9,83 4,68 1 27 21,94 
      
Size (# employees) 
Japan 413,05 1.357,62 10 13.084 1.843.133 
      
Age (years) 
Japan 18,97 14,72 0,20 58,00 216,809 
      
Managerial 
ownership prior to 
the IPO (%) 
Japan 35,38 25,17 0 86,00 6,33 
      
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
The Japanese IPO data was specifically tested for age regarding above and below 20, 15 and 
10 years, which are shown in Table 4. 
 
Age Number Average DI F p value 
above 20 46 11.4 3.16 0.08 
below 20 74 13.4   
above 15 65 10.9 11.96 0.01 
below 15 55 14.6   
above 10 82 11.2 15.08 0.00 
below 10 38 15.6   





In Table 5, the average disclosure per prospectus has been calculated as described above and 
divided into the 6 different categories depicted in Table 1.  
 
 Employees Customers IT Processes R&D Strategic 
statements 
Total* 
Max. items (27) (14) (5) (8) (9) (15) (78) 
Japan 3.12 1.92 0.46 0.34 1.55 2.44 9.83 
Table 5: Average number of items per prospectus (which is calculated as described above 
and divided into the 6 different categories depicted in Table 1) 
 
 
As indicated from Table 6, there is a difference in the level of information between the 
different industry categories. The numbers of observations in some industry categories are 
rather small, but the difference with respect to disclosure between so-called traditional 
sectors, i.e. manufacturing, commercial and service companies, and high-tech sectors, i.e. IT, 
technology, pharmaceutical and biological engineering is statistically significant. These 
differences are consistent with the studies by Bukh et al. (2005), Cooke (1989, 1991) and 
Meek et al. (1995) who also concluded that the ratio of voluntary disclosure varies across 
industries. Since the number of Japanese IPO prospectuses is limited it was decided to 
aggregate the initial four industries into two main sectors, the high-tech comprising and low-
tech sectors for the remainder of the analysis. 
 
Analysis of company characteristics influencing disclosure 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test, controlling for technological type of the 
company (high-tech/low-tech), if the extent of managerial ownership before the IPO, 
 Employees Customers IT Processes R&D Strategic 
Statements  
Total  Disclosure 
% 
IT and technology 
(n=30) 
3.6 2.4 1.0 0.4 2.3 2.7 12.4 15.9 
Pharmaceutical and 
Research  (n=1) 
4 5 0 0 6 6 21 26.9 
Production (n=28) 1.9 2.0 0.4 0.3 3 2.7 10.3 13.2 
Trade & Service 
(n=64) 
3.5 1.7 0.3 0.3 0.5 2.2 8.6 11.1 
Table 6: Average amount of disclosure by industry and category, Japan 
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company age and company size influenced disclosure. In order to conduct the ANOVA 
analysis, we divided the data on the independent variables into discrete groups in order to 
determine whether there is an effect on disclosure as the presumed dependent variable.  
 
As an explanation of high-tech and low-tech companies, the extent of „managerial ownership 
before the IPO‟ was classified according the existence of such managerial ownership in the 
company at the time of IPO or not. This variable was thus measured as either „no pre-IPO 
managerial ownership‟ or „pre-IPO managerial ownership‟ in the cases where this was 
present. The variable „company age‟ was measured in years and operationalised by 
distinguishing between young companies and old companies where enterprises aged less than 
20 years were considered as young companies. Lastly, „company size‟ was treated by dividing 
the data into small companies – of less than 250 employees – and large companies – of 250 
employees or more. 
 
H1: Industry differences 
The independent variable „technology type‟ had a significant influence on the extent of the 
disclosure. Totally, High-tech companies (n=53) disclosed significantly more information 
(mean score=18.11, disclosure level 18.11/78) than low-tech companies (n=135) (mean 
score=10.16, disclosure level=10.16/78)(F=62.421, p<0.01). This contradicts Verrechia‟s 
(1983) findings were companies are expected to disclose more information when the cost-of-
capital is low, which we discuss further in our concluding remarks.  
 
Nonetheless, the significance of the “technology type” variable is not surprising considering 
the industrial categories from the previous section. An array of research has been conducted 
on value relevance of non-financial information for valuating knowledge-intensive companies 
(Mavrinac & Boyle, 1996; Mavrinac & Seisfeld, 1997). Sakakibara et al. (2005) asked 260 
Japanese analysts, including financial analysts, fund managers, equity strategists, economists 
and venture capitalists, regarding the importance for Japanese analysts‟ in having access to 
non-financial information when valuating knowledge-intense companies compared to 
traditional companies. Sakakibara et al. (2005) found that Japanese analysts demanded 
significantly more IC information for estimating the value of knowledge-intensive companies 




H2: Managerial ownership 
The independent variable „managerial ownership‟ indicated that managerial ownership prior 
to the IPO did not have a significant effect on Japanese companies‟ disclosure. Japanese 
companies where management had an ownership share in the company at the time of listing 
on the stock exchange did therefore not disclose more information concerning intellectual 
capital. Japanese companies where managerial ownership was above 50% (n=54) disclosed 
insignificantly more information (mean score=12.44, disclosure level 12.44/78) than other 
companies (n=134) (mean score=12.38, disclosure level=12.38/78) (F=1.132, p<0.289). 
However, if we change threshold of managerial ownership from 50% to 40%, above 40% 
managerial ownership company (n=76) disclosed insignificantly more information (mean 
score=12.41, disclosure level 12.41/78) than other companies (n=111) (mean score=12.40, 
disclosure level=12.40/78) (F=3.382, p<0.068). If we change threshold of managerial 
ownership from 40% to 10%, above 10% managerial ownership company (n=66) disclosed 
insignificantly more information (mean score=12.45, disclosure level 12.45/78) than other 
companies (n=122) (mean score=12.30, disclosure level=12.30/78) (F=8.804, p<0.003), as 
well. 
 
The results from the Japanese companies are contradicting to previous studies by Demirag et 
al. (2000) and O‟Sullivan (2000). In a similar study, Bukh et al. (2005) discussed the reason 
for the influence of Pre-IPO managerial ownership on disclosure being that managers might 
have a greater incentive to market their companies, and to increase their personal profit as a 
result of a lowered cost of capital. However, Japanese managers seemingly do not have a 
greater incentive to disclose more non-financial voluntary information about their companies 
in order to amplify profit from lower cost of capital from an IPO, which we discuss further in 
our concluding remarks. 
 
H3: Company size 
The independent variable „company size‟ had no significant influence on the extent of the 
disclosure by Japanese companies. Companies whose employee are more than 250 (n=69) 
disclosed a little bit more, however insignificantly, information (mean score=13.84, disclosure 
level 13.84/78) than other companies (n=119) (mean score=11.56, disclosure level 11.56/78) 
(F=0.260, p<0.611). Hence, the results from our analysis are contrary to Ahmed and Courtis 
(1999) as well as Adrem (1999), since our findings cannot corroborate their results that small 
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companies should disclose more information and details compared to large companies. 
Moreover, our findings strongly support Wallace‟s (1988) and Stanga‟s (1976) conclusions 
that company size is not a significant factor explaining voluntary disclosure of information. 
 
H4: Company age 
The independent variable „age‟ had a significant influence on the extent of disclosure for 
Japanese companies. Japanese companies whose age are above 20 years (n=73) disclosed 
insignificantly a little bit more information (mean score=12.68, disclosure level 12.68/78) 
than other companies (n=110) (mean score=12.35, disclosure level 12.35/78) (F=0.030, 
p<0.862). 
 
Additional checks have been done for Japanese companies above and below 15 years and 
above and below 10 years. Our analysis also showed that „age‟ had a significant influence on 
the extent of disclosure by Japanese companies at the check for above and below 15 years. A 
Japanese company whose age is below 15 years (n=55) disclosed more information (14.6%) 
than a Japanese company whose age is above 15 years (n=65) (10.9%) (F=11.96, p=0.01). In 
addition the check for above and below 10 years confirmed that „age‟ had a significant 
influence on the extent of disclosure by Japanese companies. A Japanese company whose age 
is below 10 years (n=38) disclosed more information (15.6%) than a Japanese company 
whose age is above 10 years (n=82) (11.2%) (F=15.08, p=0.00). Hence, the findings for the 
Japanese companies confirmed Kim and Ritter‟s (1999) results that IC information is of 
greater importance when valuing younger companies, as our tests showed that the amount of 
disclosure is increasing the younger the age of the company from 13,4% (<20) to 14,6% (<15) 
to 15,6% (<10). Our analysis shows that the Japanese companies below 10 years of age have a 
2,2% higher disclosure rate than Japanese companies below 20 years of age. 
 
Concluding remarks 
We set out to study the voluntary disclosure of information on intellectual capital in Japanese 
IPO prospectuses. This research question was found to be of great interest in the light of the 
recent initiatives regarding disclosure of intellectual capital in Japan. Initiatives which were 
commenced after the IPO prospectuses studied were disclosed. Thus we set out to gain 
insights on the perceptions of the Japanese financial community on intellectual capital 
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information. Japan is also an interesting country in which to study intellectual capital as the 
country for several decades has been renowned for its innovativeness both in relation to new 
technologies, but also in relation to process-engineering and efficiency. In the late 1980‟s 
Japan was at the forefront of business research into knowledge management, and therefore it 
is interesting to study if there have been any spill-over effects.  
 
From the analyses we can derive conclusions from each of the four hypotheses. The first 
factor studied, namely „industry differences‟ (H1), found that high-tech companies disclosed 
more information on intellectual capital than companies in industries were technology played 
a lesser role in value creation. In relation to previous studies, this was not surprising. 
However, Verrechia (1983) argues that companies are expected to disclose more information 
when the cost-of-capital is low, and this contradicts the fact that the low-tech companies 
disclose less, as stable business models and stable cash flows could be expected to induce 
certainty to investors and thus lower their cost-of-capital.  
 
The second factor „Managerial ownership‟ (H2) elaborated upon the association between the 
amount of IC disclosure and the existence of managerial ownership before the IPO. This 
hypothesis was found to be insignificant for Japanese companies studied. This might be 
attributable to the fact that all Japanese issuers now select „book building‟
2
 when introducing 
IPO‟s. Book building includes a discussion about the IPO price from the underwriting 
security company with financial analysts and other parties. According to Kutsuna and Smith 
(2004), book building enables more accurate valuation than the auction-offering method from 
the capital market
3
. Therefore, the insignificance of „managerial ownership‟, as well as 
„company size‟ as discussed in the following, might be attributable to the book building 
method absorbing the effects of disclosing additional IC information. 
 
The results for the third factor „company size‟ (H3) showed that company size is not a 
significant factor explaining voluntary disclosure of information. Hence, our findings 
contribute to the varying findings from previous studies. While supporting Wallace‟s (1988) 
and Stanga‟s (1976) conclusions that size is not a significant factor for the amount of 
                                                 
2
 Under book building the underwriter sets a minimum and maximum price and seeks indications of interest, 
primarily from institutional investors. Institutional investors submit nonbinding price and quantity indications 
to the underwriter. The underwriter, in selecting the final offer price, can accept the quantity indications above 
the price and sells any remaining shares to the public (Kutsuna & Smith, pp. 1130-1140). 
3
 Within one month, after its introduction in 1997, all issuers in Japan were selecting book building, though 
auctioning is still available as a choice (Kutsuna & Smith, p. 1130). 
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disclosure; our results are contrasting Ahmed and Courtis (1999) and Adrem (1999) findings, 
as small companies did not disclose more information and details compared to large 
companies.  
 
The results for the Japanese companies indicated that the fourth factor „company age‟ (H4), 
had a significant influence on the extent of disclosure for Japanese companies. Further testing 
of the Japanese companies regarding age showed a continuing trend, as Japanese companies 
below 10 years disclosed 2,2% more information about IC than Japanese companies below 20 
years.  
 
Thus industry and age were the two hypothesis this study could conclude to be significant. 
When comparing the overall disclosure levels with previous studies in Denmark, Italy and 
Sweden, the Japanese companies studied have relatively low levels of IC disclosure. Also, the 
two hypotheses that we have rejected have been significant in a number of studies. This leads 
us to the questions of culture and traditions in the Japanese financial community. 
 
Future prospects on IC reporting in IPO’s 
In order to move closer to understanding the differences between Japanese voluntary 
disclosure practices and that of other western countries, further studies contemplating the 
differences in the general governance structure of companies, the disclosure culture (including 
secrecy and fears of losing competitiveness), the legal environment, and the fact that the 
Japanese stock market has underperformed international stock markets performance-wise for 
the last 15 years, are needed. Likewise, differences in the general size of the economy and 
companies and differences relating to the structure of the competitive environment, country 
disclosure norms will possibly differ because of different institutional and legal environments. 
Robb, Single and Zarzeski (2001) show country norms to affect voluntary disclosure 
practices. The authors also recognize the possibilities of applying case studies and further, 
perhaps more qualitative content analyses, to this agenda.  
 
Our study indicates that companies and their advisors believe that non-financial information is 
important in the capital market's assessment of the company‟s value. Consequently, analysing 
the motives behind the disclosure of intellectual capital and about how this information will 
be assed by the capital market would make necessary to obtain deeper knowledge on how 
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analysts and investors work with information about intellectual capital. Holland (2004) as 
well as Rimmel‟s (2003) interview studies with analysts indicate that intellectual capital 
disclosures are considered by analysts when they evaluate companies. 
 
Finally, a more detailed understanding of companies‟ motives for disclosure as well as 
analysts‟ and investors‟ need for information should make the link to the companies‟ cost of 
equity capital. Schrand & Verrecchia (2004) have demonstrated that greater disclosure 
frequency in the period prior to the IPO is associated with lower underpricing as well as some 
of the more traditional measures of a companies‟ cost of capital such as bid-ask spread and 
analyst forecast dispersion also will be lower. Moreover, Guo, Lev & Zhou (2004) provide 
evidence that the disclosure of information related to product development, patent protection 
and venture capital backing in biotech IPO prospectuses subsequently lowers bid-ask spread 
and share return volatility. Since we found contradicting results regarding cost of disclosure 
theory, which might be attributable to the absorbing effects of book building for additional IC 
information. Consequently, we suggest studying further the relationship between IPO pricing 
and the level of disclosure by applying pricing experiments to analyze the effects of book 
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Appendix 1: The Disclosure Index 
% of companies 
making disclosure 
% of companies 
making disclosure 
 JP  JP 
Employees (27 items) 11,7 IT (5 items) 10,6 
Staff breakdown by age 0,8 Description & reason for investments in IT 13,8 
Staff breakdown by seniority 0,0 IT systems 22,0 
Staff breakdown by gender 0,0 Software assets 10,6 
Staff breakdown by nationality 0,0 Description of IT facilities 4,9 
Staff breakdown by department 22,0 IT expenses 1,6 
Staff breakdown by job function 8,9   
Staff breakdown by level of education 3,3 Processes (8 items) 4,7 
Rate of staff turnover 1,6 Efforts related to the working 
environment, 
0,0 
Comments on changes in number of 
employees  
8,1 Information and communication within the 
company 
4,1 
Staff health and safety 1,6 Working from home 0,0 
Education and training expenses/number of 
employees 
0,0 Internal sharing of knowledge and 
information  
14,6 
Staff interview 0,8 Measure of internal or external failures 0,0 
Statements of policy on competence 
development 
39,0 External sharing of knowledge and 
information 
12,2 
Description of competence development 
program and activities 
14,6 Fringe benefits and company social  
programs 
3,3 
Education and training expenses 0,0 Environmental approvals and 
statements/policies 
3,3 
Absence 0,0   
Employee expenses/number of employees 67,5 Research & Development (9 items) 17,6 
Recruitment policies 53,7 Statements of policy, strategy and/or 
objectives of R&D activities  
47,2 
HRM department, division or function 0,8 R&D expenses 35,0 
Job rotation opportunities 1,6 R&D expenses/sales 2,4 
Career opportunities 2,4 R&D invested in basic research 12,2 
Remuneration and incentive systems 49,6 R&D invested in product 
design/development 
20,3 
Pensions 0,8 Future prospects regarding R&D 7,3 
Insurance policies  2,4 Details of company patents 9,8 
Statements of dependence on key personnel 33,3 Number of patents and licenses etc, 10,6 
Revenues/employee 3,3 Patents pending 13,8 
Value added/employee 0,8   
  Strategic statements (15 items) 18,1 
Customers (14 items) 14,2 Description of new production technology 35,0 
Number of customers 2,4 Statements of corporate quality 
performance 
11,4 
Sales breakdown by customer 24,4 Strategic alliances  40,7 
Annual sales pr, segment or product 88,6 Objectives and reason for strategic 
alliances 
26,0 
Average customer size 7,3 Comments on the effects of the strategic 
alliances 
9,8 
Dependence on key customers 39,8 Description of the network of suppliers 
and distributors 
74,8 
Description of customer involvement 6,5 Statements of image and brand  23,6 
Description of customer relations 17,1 Corporate culture statements 0,8 
Education/training of customers 3,3 Best Practise 5,7 
Customers/employees 0,8 Organisational structure 27,6 
Value added pr, customer or segment 0,8 Utilisation of energy, raw materials and 
other input goods 
0,8 
Market share (%) 1,6 Investment in the environment 5,7 
Relative market share  0,8 Description of community involvement 3,3 
Market share, breakdown by 
country/segment/product 
4,1 Information on corporate social 
responsibility and objective 
4,9 
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